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ABSTRACT 
 
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE NETWORK CORE  
AND 
 CONVEXITY  
 
 
Yılmaz Koçer 
M.A. in Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray             
 
January, 2004 
 
 
In this study, we analyze the relationships between the value function - allocation 
rule setting and the TU game setting induced by value functions. As several 
different value functions may induce the same TU game, there is some 
information lost when passing to the TU game setting. We inquire in this study 
the impact of this lost information upon the preservation of the nonemptiness of 
the core when we pass from the network to the TU game setting. We pass from a 
value function to a TU game by associating with each coalition the maximal 
value of the graphs this coalition can form under the given value function. 
Conversely, we may associate with each TU game one of the value functions that 
induce the given TU game. Keeping this fixed, we define the network core as the 
collection of graphs where no coalition has an incentive to change the 
cooperation structure in itself, assuming that the rest of the society consists of 
isolated agents. Besides, we define convexity in the value function setting in an 
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analogous fashion to convexity for the TU games. As convexity implies the 
nonemptiness of the core in both settings (a well-known result in the TU setting, 
and a trivial one in the value function setting), we inquire if convexity is 
preserved in passing from one setting to the other. We find that convexity of the 
value function is equivalent to a stronger type of convexity of the induced game.       
 
Keywords: value function, convexity, network core 
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ÖZET 
 
AĞ ÇEKİRDEKLERİ VE DIŞBÜKEYLİK ÜZERİNE BAZI 
GÖZLEMLER 
 
 
 Yılmaz Koçer 
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans  
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Semih Koray             
 
Ocak, 2004 
 
Bu çalışmada, değer fonksiyonu - dağıtım kuralı kurulumuyla, değer 
fonksiyonunun doğurduğu aktarılabilir yarar oyunu kurulumu arasındakı ilişkiler 
incelenmiştir. Aynı aktarılabilir yarar oyununu doğuran çok sayıda değer 
fonksiyonu bulunabildiğinden, aktarılabilir yarar oyunu kurulumuna geçerken 
belli bir bilgi kaybı söz konusudur. Bu çalışmada araştırılan şey bu bilgi 
kaybının, çekirdeğin boş olmaması gibi temel unsurların bu aktarım sırasında 
kaybolup kaybolmadığıdır. Verilen bir değer fonksiyonundan aktarılabilir yarar 
oyununa, her koalisyona o koalisyonun, verilen değer fonksiyonu altında 
oluşturabileceği en yüksek değerli çizgenin değerini eşleştirerek geçeriz. Aynı 
şekilde verilen bir aktarılabilir yarar oyununu da, onu doğuran bir değer 
fonksiyonlarından biri ile eşleştirebiliriz. Verilen bir değer fonksiyonuna göre ağ 
çekirdeği ise,  herhangi bir koalisyonun, geri kalanlar yalıtılmış halde iken, kendi 
içlerinde daha yüksek değer yaratacak yeni bir çizgeyi oluşturamayacakları 
çizgeler topluluğu olarak tanımlanır. Değer fonksiyonu kurulumunda dışbükeylik 
de, aktarılabilir yarar oyunlarındakine benzer bir biçimde tanımlanır. 
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Dışbükeylik her iki kurulumda da çekirdeğin boş olmamasını gerektirdiğinden, 
(aktarılabilir yarar oyunlarında bilinen bir teoremden, değer fonksiyonları 
kurulumunda ise lemma 3 den dolayı) bu  iki kurulumdaki dışbükeylikler 
arasındaki gerekirlik ilişkisi incelenir. Değer fonksiyonunun dışbükeyliği, 
doğurduğu aktarılabilir yarar oyununda daha güçlü bir dışbükeyliğe denktir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler : değer fonksiyonu, dışbükeylik, ağ çekirdeği 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  The use of network structures in economic research yielded some important 
results in many diverse fields. Essentially, in several economic settings agents’ 
interaction between each other, unilaterally or bilaterally, can be represented by a 
suitable network structure. For example, buyer and seller networks, the symmetric 
connections model provide a framework, where the underlying network structure can be  
analyzed through some efficiency and stability concepts. 
In Myerson’s seminal paper (1977) he made extensive use of the notion of a 
cooperation structure underlying the communication possibilities of a set of agents. 
Given a fixed network g and a TU game to represent the value creating ability of a 
coalition, a graph induced game is introduced. The value of a coalition in the induced 
game is defined as the sum of the values of its communicating subcoalitions of under the 
initial value function and the given cooperation structure. Jackson (1996) extended this 
framework to a more general setting where the value function itself is originally defined 
on the set of all possible graphs, whereas in Myerson’s setting, only the communicating 
coalitions would matter, not the particular way they are linked with each other. This 
generalization in the setting has been useful in revealing new facts regarding efficiency 
and stability.  
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In this study, we analyze the relationships between the value function setting and 
the cooperative game setting where we induce a TU game from the value function by 
associating with each coalition the maximal value of the graphs it can form  under the 
given value function. Similarly we can associate a value function with a given TU game 
by choosing a value function that induces that TU game. We define the network core 
with respect to a value function as the collection of all graphs where no coalition has any 
incentives to alter the current structure in itself, assuming the rest of the society to 
consist of isolated agents. The network core is a key concept in this study, which we try 
to relate to the core of the associated TU game. When we pass from a value function to 
the induced TU game, obviously some information gets lost, as we consider only the 
maximal values that coalitions are able to create. In this study we inquire whether the 
information lost by passing to a TU game is important or not. We are mainly interested 
in the preservation of some basic attributes about the original situation, such as the 
nonemptiness of the core. In general, the nonemptiness of the core on either side, may it 
be network core or the core of the TU game, does not necessarily imply the 
nonemptiness of the same on the other side. But when we restrict ourselves to “convex 
structures” some positive results are obtained. Defining convexity for a value function 
analogously to the convexity of a TU game, convexity of the value function turns out to 
be equivalent to the “per capita” convexity of the associated TU game, which is stronger 
than convexity.  
A second result we establish here is about the relationship between the network 
core and the allocation rule. We find that the network core with respect to a value 
function is the intersection of the network cores with respect to a value function and 
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allocation rule pair for a quite large class of allocation rules, namely the value monotonic 
allocation rules.  
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 CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
There are some contributions to economic theory using network structures for 
many diverse fields including employment search, internal organization of firms, 
systems compatibility, information transmission and the structure of airline routes. There 
is also a game theoretic literature on network structures including the marriage problem 
setting, games of flow, and games with communication structures. In his seminal paper, 
Myerson (1977) studied cooperative games with communication structures. Given a set 
of agents N, a graph g on N is a set of unordered doubletons from the set of agents N, 
where each such doubleton is interpreted as a link between its members. Thus g can be 
regarded as representing  a communication structure that determines who is 
communication-wise connected to whom in the set of agents, where a link between two 
agents means that these can communicate with each other. Considering indirect 
communications also as feasible, if there is a sequence of links between a pair of agents, 
we infer that they can communicate under g. Thus g partitions the set of agents into 
communicating coalitions; the vertices of the maximal connected subgraphs form the 
communicating coalitions induced by g. Similarly any given coalition is partitioned into 
sub-coalitions whose agents can communicate with each other under g. Given a 
cooperative game (N,v), and a graph g representing the underlying communication 
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structure, Myerson derives another TU game, namely the graph-restricted game vg  in 
which the value of each coalition  S is  simply defined as the sum of the values of  the 
communicating subcoalitions of S induced by g according to the original cooperative 
game v.  The idea was that, if the new cooperative game is to measure the potential 
value of a coalition S under the communication structure, as the units that generate value 
are the connected subcoalitions, then these values can be summed up to give the value 
for the coalition S. Myerson defined for networks an analogue of the value operator 
concept in the context of cooperative games, namely the "allocation rule" to distribute 
the total value generated in the graph restricted game among the agents. He 
characterized his allocation rule by two fairness conditions: equal bargaining power and 
component balancedness. The first implies that, if a new link is added to the existing 
graph, the agents adding the link should benefit equally from the addition of the new 
link, that is the marginal contribution or  loss of adding the new link should be the same 
for the two agents. The second is that the value generated by a component should be 
distributed to the members of that component; value transfers between components are 
ruled out..  
The essential contribution of Myerson's setting is the dependence of the value 
distributed to a coalition on the underlying communication structure. A coalition can 
generate different values under different communication structures. But this graph-
dependence of the value that is distributed to a coalition is limited in the sense that it 
does not matter how the agents in a coalition are connected; only the set of connected 
players matters. In order to obtain a more general setting, Jackson & Wolinsky  (1996) 
start with an explicit value function defined on the set of networks that can be formed. 
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Thus, in this setting, the particular connections between the agents are recognized; the 
value to different networks may differ even if they connect the same sets of players 
directly or indirectly. An "allocation rule" is a function defined on pairs of possible 
graphs and value functions associating a unique payoff vector representing the value 
distributed to each agent for each such pair. Put in this way, the value function and the 
allocation rule concepts are natural extensions of the notions of a characteristic function 
and a value operator from cooperative game theory. But in the network setting, they 
depend on the full network structure rather than just the partition of players into 
connected subsets via the network structure. 
Jackson & Wolinsky (1996), characterize an allocation rule, which is again based 
on the Shapley value, with the similar motivation to Myerson's allocation rule. They 
define efficiency and stability notions in their generalized setting. Efficiency is obtained 
when a graph maximizes the total value; stability is attained when no pair of agents 
wants to add a new link to the graph, and no agent wants to sever an existing link 
incident with himself from the current graph. In both the symmetric connections model 
and the co-authorship model, they focus on the tension between efficiency and stability.  
They find that the compatibility of overall societal welfare (efficiency) with individual 
incentives to form and sever links (stability) depends on the cost parameter in the 
symmetric connections model and is absent in the co-authorship model, as in this model 
stable networks will always tend to be over-connected from an efficiency perspective. 
For the generalized model they show that, no component-balanced and anonymous 
allocation rule can guarantee this compatibility, that is the existence of an efficient graph 
that is pairwise stable for each given value function. They show this by constructing a 
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particular “problematic” value function. The approach here is to take the value function 
as exogenously given, whereas the allocation rule is the designer's object. In a later 
paper by Jackson (2003a), he finds that the incompatibility prevails even if we relax 
anonymity to "equal treatment of equals property" and efficiency to "constrained 
efficiency". He also finds that when the value function is anonymous and there exists an 
efficient graph where each agent is linked to at least two agents, the compatibility is 
reconciled. On the other hand, when graphs with directed links between the agents are 
considered, the incompatibility continues to prevail. In this setting, pairwise stability is 
replaced by individual stability; that is, agents can only control the links emanating from 
themselves, but cannot control any other links, including the ones directed to them ( 
Jackson & Dutta, 2000).  As a last note for this discussion, Dutta & Mutuswami (1997) 
show that restricting the problem to a particular class of value functions solves the 
compatibility problem again. 
When we consider the “allocation rule” as an object to be designed, another 
important problem arises. Many common allocation rules including the Myerson 
allocation rule implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed when 
distributing value to the agents. Jackson (2003b) criticizes this approach by saying that, 
as in many situations the network structure can be altered by the agents, the allocation 
rule should be sensitive to the alternative network structures when deciding to distribute 
value at a given network. For example, Myerson allocation rule considers only the 
values of subgraphs but not the alternative networks. Jackson presents a new family of 
allocation rules that takes alternative networks into account when distributing value on a 
given network, and calls this class “flexible network rules”. Flexible network rules take 
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into account the contribution of a given link (or player) to various networks is deciding 
on what the contribution of a link (or player) to the given graph is. 
Many authors have used this framework to model different economic situations. 
Currarini (2002) studies organizations and externalities under the network setting, where 
value of a graph depends only on the partition of players induced by the components of 
the graph. Though it seems that the other aspects of graph structure are not important in 
this approach, it should also be noted that, if some group of players changes their links, 
the resulting network and thus the partition of agents and the value associated with the 
new graph depends on how the players were connected at the initial graph, and not just 
on what the communicating coalitions were. In this setting he defines positive and 
negative externalities based on whether the value increases or decreases as the partition 
of players becomes finer. He finds that, positive externalities favor the adoption of 
dispersed organizations, while negative externalities favor the formation of more 
cohesive structures. Kranton & Minehart ( 2001) introduce a model for buyer-seller 
networks. They try to answer the question when buyers and sellers can form efficient 
network structures while acting non-cooperatively. They draw attention to efficient 
allocation of goods and claim that the buyer earns the marginal surplus from exchange, 
aligning buyers’ incentives with social welfare.   They show evidence for this fact in 
studies of industrial-supply networks.   
Up to now, we have surveyed some of the literature that analyzed the efficiency 
and stability matters statically on a given graph, without any reference to the formation 
of a network starting from the empty graph. Thus a very important direction of research 
is to consider social and economic networks dynamically; that is, to investigate what 
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happens when networks form in time according to a particular network formation 
process, modeled as a network formation game. When networks are viewed as  ultimate 
structures that are formed through such a process, they can be analyzed utilizing the 
equilibrium concepts associated with the game through which the formation takes place. 
Aumann & Myerson (1988) were the first to model network formation explicitly 
as a game. In their extensive form game, given an exogenous ranking of pairs of players, 
the pairs in turn decide whether or not to form a link knowing the decisions of all the 
pairs before them and forecasting the decisions that will come after them. A decision to 
form a link is binding and cannot be undone. In equilibrium, the payoffs to the players 
are determined by the Shapley value of the graph restricted game vg, where g is the final 
network and v is the initially given cooperative game. They find that the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of this game may lead to inefficient graphs, which is 
again an example of the incompatibility problem we mentioned before.  
Following Myerson (1991), Slikker & Nouweland (2000) modeled network 
formation as a normal form game where the players simultaneously announce the set of 
agents they want to form links with. The mutual consent of the two agents is necessary 
to form a link. The payoffs to players are determined as in the Aumann & Myerson 
(1988) setting. In this game, as the strategy profile consisting of the empty set for all 
agents will always be a Nash equilibrium (NE) of this game regardless of the underlying 
cooperative game, and as the formation of a link requires the consent of both players, 
they use refinements of NE such as strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) and the coalition 
proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) in addition to undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) 
and trembling hand perfection. In their model, there are fixed costs to form links and 
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thus the model yields a cost extended version of Myerson’s communication structure 
setting. The very surprising result of their study is that if the underlying cooperative 
game is convex but not superadditive, increasing costs to links may yield  more links to 
be formed in many NE refinements. They conclude that “Authorities wishing to promote 
more cooperation cannot always rely on subsidies to accomplish this goal. In fact, such 
subsidies may have an adverse effect” (Slikker & Nouweland, 2000: 357).  
Dutta, Nouweland & Tijs (1998) study the same normal form game setting, 
without a cost assigned to links and this time payoffs being determined by an allocation 
rule satisfying some appealing fairness axioms. They show that, if the underlying 
cooperative game is superadditive, the UNE, CPNE, SNE of the network formation 
game all lead to the complete network or a network structure that is payoff equivalent to 
it for the whole class of possible allocation rules satisfying the predetermined fairness 
axioms.  
  Currarini & Morelli (2000) try to endogenize the allocation rule, using the 
sequential game version of Aumann & Myerson (1988) network formation game. Here, 
players in turn announce the set of agents they want to form links with and a demand 
payoff on the ultimate graph that will form. Links form if there is mutual consent to 
form them and if the sum of demands of a component’s agents does not exceed the value 
generated by that component. If it exceeds, then the whole component fails, no links 
form and all agents in the component get zero payoff. This extensive form game with 
complete information has a subgame perfect equilibrium. They show that the SPNE of 
this game leads to efficient networks for the class of size monotonic value functions.  
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Dutta & Mutuswami (1997) study Myerson’s normal form game (Myerson, 
1991).  They adopt a mechanism design approach in the sense that they consider the 
allocation rule as an object to be designed. Thus they construct an allocation rule, which 
will ensure that, under mild restrictions imposed on the value functions, efficient graphs 
will form when self-interested agents decide to form and break links. The allocation rule 
is anonymous on the stable graphs, thus it causes no ethical problems if “ethical 
properties” are considered only at equilibria, which correspond to the SNE of the 
network formation game. 
As a last note on network formation, the studies mentioned here all assume that 
the agents are myopic in the sense that they do not consider future reactions of the other 
agents to their decisions at a given stage of the network formation. Some attempts to 
model farsighted agents in network formation include Watts (2002). In her extensive 
form game where the value function and the allocation rule are imported from the 
symmetric connections model by Jackson & Wolinsky (1996), agents take possible 
future networks that may form in the following stages into account and decide whether 
to form a link or not in accordance with the maximization problem in which future 
benefits are discounted to the present by a constant. She finds that forward-looking 
agents may form a network shaped like a circle, when one starts from the empty 
network, although the cost of forming the first link exceeds its benefit. 
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CHAPTER 3 
                                      THE MODEL 
 
 
 
Let N = {1,......,n} be the set of agents. A graph g on N is a set of unordered 
doubletons from the set N, which we call links. The vertices are the agents. For example, 
let N = {1,2,3} and g = {{1,2},{2,3}}. Here agent 1 is linked with agent 2 and agent 2 is 
linked with agent 3, however agents 1 and 3 are not linked under g. Thus we represent 
bilateral relations between two agents by a link between them. Here the links are not 
directed and they do not carry any intensity information about the communication 
possibilities of the agents. In this setting, a graph is  just a set of links.  
Let gN = {{i,j}  i∈N , j∈N,  i ≠ j }.   Here gN is the set of all subsets of N of 
cardinality 2. Note that a graph can also be defined as any subset g of gN. We refer gN as 
the complete graph on N. In a similar fashion, we will denote the complete graph on S as 
gS where S ⊂  N. 
Hereafter, for ease of notation we will use ij to denote {i,j}, the link between the 
agents i and j. Let G = {g | g ⊂ gN } be the set of all possible graphs on N. 
Given a graph g ∈ G, let N(g) = {i ∃ j∈N  s.t. ij ∈ g}, that is the set of 
individuals who are involved in at least one link in g. The agents not in N(g) are called 
isolated players under g. 
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Given a graph g ∈ G, a sequence of individuals i1,...., iK ∈ N such that iKiK+1 ∈ g  
for each k ∈ {1,..., K-1}, with  i1 = i and iK = j, is called a path in g between the 
individuals i and j. 
Given a graph g ∈ G and  S ⊂  N,  gS  = g  ∩  gS  = { ij  ij ∈ g  and  i,j ∈ S } 
and we call gS  the restriction of g to S.  
Given a graph g ∈ G, any nonempty subgraph g’ ⊂ g such that 
1) there exists a path in g’ between i and j for any i, j ∈ N(g’) with i ≠ j,  and  
2) there does not exist a path in g between i and j for any i ∈ N(g’) and  
j ∈ N \ N(g’), 
is called a component of g. 
The components of a graph are its maximal connected subgraphs. We will denote 
the set of components of a graph g by C(g).      
A function v : G → ℜ is called a value function. 
The value function represents the total value created through the formation of a 
graph. It assigns to each possible network structure a real number. Note that the value 
function is a more general framework to evaluate the total value generated by a graph 
than the graph restricted game framework of Myerson (1977). In the latter what only 
matters is what the connected components are; in the former, however, it also matters 
how the agents within a component are connected. We assume that v(Ø) = 0, that is no 
value can be created in the absence of any connections between the agents.  
We will denote the set of all value functions, that is all functions of the form  v : 
G → ℜ, by V.  But in our study we will mostly be interested in settings where the value 
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is strictly positive except at the empty graph, as in Dutta & Mutuswami (1997). Let V+ 
stands for this class of value functions, i.e.,  V+ = { v ∈ V v(Ø) = 0 and v(g) > 0  for all 
g∈ G \ {{Ø}}.  
Given a value function v ∈ V, we say that a network g* is efficient with respect to 
v iff  v(g*) ≥ v(g) for all g ∈ G. As graphs on N are finite, there exists at least one 
efficient network with respect to v. 
Given a permutation of agents π (i.e., a bijection on N) and any g ∈ G, we let  
π(g) = { π( i ) π( j )  ij ∈ g }.   Thus  π(g)  has the same architecture as g, with the 
vertices  permuted under π. We say that v is anonymous iff for any permutation π and 
any g ∈ G, one has   v( π(g))  = v (g). 
We say that v is monotonic iff for all g, g’∈G with g ⊂ g’  we have v(g’ ) ≥ v(g). 
A natural interpretation for monotonicity is that more cooperation leads to more 
value. In this case, we assume that link formation is not costly, or at least the link costs 
do not have a substantial effect on the value created. 
v is convex iff for all g, g’∈G,  v( g ) +  v( g’ ) ≤  v( g ∪  g’)  +  v( g ∩ g’). 
Convexity of a value function implies that each link creates a higher marginal increase 
in value when added to a greater network structure. 
 v is component additive iff   for all g ∈ G,      v(g)  =  v(h).  Note that 
component additivity requires that value generated by a component should not depend 
on the structure of the rest of the network.    
∑
∈ )(h gC
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Now we define the network core NC(v) with respect to a value function v ∈ V   
by  NC(v) = {g ∈ G  v( gS ) ≥  v( g’) for all S and for all g’⊂ gS }. 
 A natural interpretation for the network core is that it chooses the graphs with 
optimally connected agents in the value maximizing sense. If we assume the existence of 
a possible way to distribute the generated value among the agents while aligning 
individual incentives with efficiency, then we should expect that the graphs formed will 
be such that no coalition can do better on its own. That is, from a stability perspective, at 
a given state if in a particular graph there is a coalition S with a better communication 
opportunity than the present one in itself, then we can naturally expect that  coalition to 
deviate from the existing structure to a better one for itself. Of course, here we assume 
that the coalition members are able to find a way to distribute the marginal increase in 
value among themselves, in a satisfactory manner. 
A function  Y :  G  ×  V →  ℜ N  such that  ∑
i
Yi ( g, v ) = v( g )  for all    v ∈ V 
and g ∈ G , is called an allocation rule.  Let Y be the set of all such allocation rules. 
An allocation rule distributes the total value to the agents for each graph -  value 
function pair. The balancedness condition is built into the definition, that is the 
allocation rule distributes exactly the value of the given graph under the particular value 
function. In a sense, an allocation rule is analogus  to a value operator in cooperative 
game theory. In many contexts allocation rules are considered as objects to be designed 
rather than  naturally arising rules. Generally allocation rules are characterized through 
some “fairness” axioms, as is exemplified by Jackson (1996) who uses equal bargaining 
power and component balancedness for this purpose. In some models, the structure of 
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the value function is such that it is naturally associated with an  allocation rule as in the 
symmetric connections model in Jackson (1996).  
EXAMPLE 1   
 Let   N  = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 }. Let  v be anonymous and v( 12 ) = 1, v( 12, 13 ) =3,  
v( 12, 13, 23  ) =5,   v( gN ) =10  and  v( g ) =0  for all other  graphs g∈G not covered 
above.  
Now consider g  = {12, 13, 23},  where N( g ) = {1, 2, 3} and  agents 4, 5 are 
isolated players. There is one component of this graph, C( g ) = { g }. Now consider the 
egalitarian allocation rule Yi (g,v) = N
gv )( for all i∈N and g∈G, v∈V.   Under this 
allocation rule every agent gets a payoff of 1 at g  . 
An allocation rule Y is said to be component balanced if for any  component 
additive v, any g ∈ G, and any h ∈ C(g) 
                      Y∑
∈ )( i hN
i (g,v ) = v(h)        holds. 
An allocation rule is proportional iff for each i ∈ N and v ∈ V either Yi ( g,v )=0 
for all g, or for any g and g’ such that v(g’) ≠ 0, 
) v,g' ( Yi
) vg, ( Yi = 
) g' ( v
) g ( v . 
If the allocation rule is proportional, then for any given v, the allocation rule 
distributes the generated value to the agents with respect to a particular proportion; it is 
only the total value that changes with the graph. Trivially a proportional rule aligns 
individual incentives with overall efficiency. Actually the egalitarian allocation rule is a 
very special example of proportional rules.  
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An allocation rule satisfies the dummy axiom iff for any g, v pair, we have  
Yi ( g,v ) = 0  whenever i ∉ N(g). The dummy axiom only requires that isolated players 
will always be given zero payoff, that is to be given a positive payoff, an agent should be 
involved in some kind of cooperation.  
An allocation rule Y is said to be value-monotonic iff for any v, and any g such 
that v(g) ≥ v(g’)  for all g’⊂ gS for some S ⊃ N(g),  there does not exist any g”⊂ gS  with 
Yi (g”,v)) ≥ Yi (g ,v)  for all i∈ S holding strictly for at least one j ∈ S. 
An immediate explanation is that an allocation rule is value – monotonic iff the 
following holds: When a coalition S is optimally connected in the value maximizing 
sense, then altering the graph by a rearrangement of links among the coalition members 
should not make the coalition better off, with at least one agent being strictly better off, 
under the given allocation rule. This property of the allocation rule reflects a minimal 
incentive for the agents to align their interests with overall efficiency. Let Ψ stand for 
the set of all value-monotonic allocation rules. 
This class of allocation rules actually covers all of the most prominent allocation 
rules. For example the egalitarian allocation rule, the component-wise egalitarian 
allocation rule and Myerson Shapley allocation rule belong to this class (Jackson 
2003b). Any allocation rule that satisfies the dummy axiom or is proportional is also in 
this class as shown in lemma 1 below.  First we will define them. 
The egalitarian allocation rule is defined by YiE (g ,v) = N
gv )(   for all g, v pairs, 
and for all i∈N. 
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The component-wise egalitarian allocation rule is given through YiCE (g ,v) = 
 )(
)(
hN
hv   when v is component additive,  i∈N(h) and h∈C(g). If there does not exist 
h∈C(g) such that i∈N(h), that is i is an isolated player under g, then i gets 0 payoff. 
When v is not component additive, then YiCE (g ,v) = YiE (g ,v) for all i∈N. 
The Myerson-Shapley allocation rule is defined as 
YiMV(g,v) = (v(gS ∪ {i}) - v(gS)) (∑
⊂ {i} \ N S !
)!1(!
n
SnS −−## ) 
 for all i∈N and for all g, v pairs. 
As final note concerning the value-monotonic allocation rules is that that Ψ 
contains some allocation rules that do not exhibit even a minimal amount of anonymity. 
For example, consider the allocation rule which assigns the value of the graph to agent 1 
and assigns zero payoff to all the other agents at every graph for any value function. This 
dictatorial allocation rule which is utterly non-anonymous is clearly value-monotonic.  
EXAMPLE 2: An allocation rule that is not value monotonic. 
To see that there exist non-value-monotonic allocation rules, consider the 
allocation rule which distributes all the value evenly among the isolated players at each 
graph for every value function. Let it be equal to the egalitarian allocation rule on graphs 
with no isolated  players; that is, when there are no isolated players, the allocation rule 
distributes the value evenly among the set N of all players. Let N = {1,2,3,4} and v(12) = 
v(13)= v(23)=1 and let the “value of all other links” equal 0. Also let the value function v 
be additive, that is, for all g, g’ ∈ G with g ∩ g’ = Ø,  v(g∪g’)  = v(g) + v(g’). Note that 
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g* = {12, 13, 23} ∈ NC(v)  as  clearly v(g*S ) ≥  v( g’) for all S and for all g’⊂ gS . Now 
we claim that Y is not value monotonic. Let S = {1,2,3} and g’={12}. We have Yi (g’,v)= 
Yi (g* ,v)  = 0 for i = 1 and 2, and  Y3 (g’,v) = 0.5 > 0 = Y3 (g* ,v) .Thus Y is not value 
monotonic. 
Now we will define the network core with respect to a value function and an 
allocation rule. 
NC ( v,Y ) =  {g ∈ G ¬ ∃ (g’, S):  S⊂ N and g’⊂ gS such that Yi (g’,v)) ≥  
Yi(gS,v)  for all i∈ S and for  at least one j ∈ S the inequality holds strictly} 
A little explanation may be appropriate. The network core with respect to the 
value function v and the allocation rule Y is the set of graphs upon which no coalition 
can improve in the Pareto sense (all get better off and at least one agent of the coalition 
gets strictly better off) by deviating from the initial graph through adding or severing 
links with vertices in the coalition. As seen, here we take the approach that any coalition 
has the right to arrange the links with both vertices in the coalition, assuming that the 
allocation rule is applied to the graph obtained from the original one by deleting all the 
links with at least one vertex outside the coalition. Then the coalition will get payoffs 
with respect to the remaining graph under the original value function and allocation rule. 
As the deviation considerations of a coalition involve allocations at a graph where the 
rest of the society is considered as isolated agents, this approach proves to be useful to 
the extent that the value function is additive or at least component additive. Such 
restrictions on the value function make our approach according to which we  consider 
the values generated by the restrictions of the graph to various coalitions meaningful. 
What we find is that, for any value function, the set of the graphs that are supported as  
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network cores with respect to any allocation rule with a minimal tendency to align 
individuals with overall efficiency we use, coincides with the set of network cores with 
respect to the value function v ( lemma 2 ). 
                                
A function  w : 2N \ {Ø} → ℜ  is called a transferable utility (TU) game.  
Here, 2N denotes the set of all possible coalitions in the society.  In Myerson’s 
communication structures setting, he begins with a TU game and a graph representing 
the communication possibilities among the agents. He assumes that if the agents of a 
coalition can communicate somehow, then the value for that coalition in the initial TU 
game can be generated regardless of the way the coalition is connected. Given a graph, 
he evaluates the value of a coalition by summing the values of the connected 
subcoalitions of the original coalition under the given TU game. Jackson (1996) 
proposes another framework where the value generated directly depends on the whole 
communication structure, not only the set of coalitions that can communicate within 
themselves. In Myerson’s setting, we directly start with a TU game which determines 
the potential value of a coalition when all its agents can communicate with each other. 
Now in Jackson’s framework, we should derive a function that measures the value 
generating potential of each coalition under a given value function that assigns to each 
graph the value it generates. We do this by taking the maximal value of the graphs that a 
coalition can  form by links with both vertices in the coalition. Here we assume that any 
two agents can form a link between themselves by mutual consent, regardless of the 
remaining agents in the society. Thus a coalition can arrange in such a way that the 
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graph that forms is one that maximizes the value among all possible graphs this coalition 
can form. 
Given any value function v, we derive a TU game wv associated with v in the 
following way. For any S ⊂ N, we set wv (S) = max  v(g) 
                                                               g ⊂ gS         
 
 
Thus from the way  wv  is generated, we infer that it is monotonic, that is, if  
S,T⊂  N with  S  ⊃  T   then  wv (S) ≥ wv (T). 
We say that a TU game w is convex iff, ∀ S, T ⊂ N,  we have  
           w(S∪T)  + w(S∩T)  ≥  w(S) +  w(T).  
From cooperative game theory we know that this definition is equivalent to the 
following: 
w is convex iff ∀ S, T ⊂ N  with T ⊂ S  and  ∀i∉S, we have w( S ∪{i})  – w( S )  ≥  
w(T∪{i}) –  w(T). 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Lemma 1:  YE , YCE , YMV ∈ Ψ . Also, if Y satisfies the dummy axiom or is 
proportional, then Y∈Ψ.  
 
Proof:  Take any v, and any g with v(g) ≥ v(g’)  for all g’⊂ gS for some S ⊃ N(g)  
Assume to the contrary to the proposition that ∃g”⊂ gS  with  Yi (g”,v)) ≥  Yi (g ,v)  for all 
i∈ S ,holding strictly for at least one j∈ S. As YiE(g,v) = N
gv )(   for all i∈N, we have 
YjE(g”,v) = N
gv )"(  > N
gv )(  = YjE(g,v), which implies v(g”) > v(g), a contradiction. Thus 
YiE∈Ψ. 
 For YiCE , if v is not component additive, the proof is the same. If v is component 
additive, YiCE (g ,v) =  )(
)(
hN
hv   when i∈N(h) where h∈C(g). If there does not exist h∈C(g) 
such that i∈N(h), that is, i is an isolated player under g, then i gets 0 payoff. Now 
assume that ∃g such that v(g) ≥ v(g’)  for all g’⊂ gS for some S ⊃ N(g),  and also ∃g”⊂ 
gS  with  Yi (g”,v)) ≥  Yi (g ,v)  for all i∈ S and the inequality holds strictly for at least one 
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j ∈S. Note that from component additivity of v, v(g)  = ∑
∈ )(h gC
v(h). Also note that 
 Y∑
∈ )( i hN
i
CE
 (h,v ) =  )(
)(
hN
hv .  |N(h)| = v(h), showing  the component balancedness of 
YiCE. Now we have that, as S ⊃ N(g),   ∑
∈ )(h gC
 ∑
∈ )( i hN
 YiCE (h,v) = Y∑
∈S i
∑
∈N i
i
CE
 (g,v ) = 
v(g) < v(g”) = Y∑
∈S i
∑
∈N i
i
CE
 (g”,v ). Notice that in the double summation, isolated players 
are not taken into account as they will get zero payoff.  A contradiction, implying that 
YCE ∈ Ψ. 
∑
∈S i
∑
∈S i
∑
∈S i
Clearly YMV satisfies the dummy axiom, as all graph restrictions with or without 
the isolated agents will yield the same values in the Shapley calculations. Take any 
allocation rule satisfying the dummy axiom. Assume it is not value-monotonic. Then ∃g 
∈ G such that v(g) ≥ v(g’)  for all g’⊂ gS for some S ⊃ N(g),  and also ∃g”⊂ gS  with  Yi 
(g”,v)) ≥  Yi (g ,v)  for all i∈ S where the inequality is strict for at least one j ∈S. As we 
know that N \ S consists of isolated agents, from the balancedness condition built in the 
definition of the allocation rule, summing both sides over i, we get that Yi (g,v ) = 
Yi (g,v ) + Y
S/
i (g,v )  = v(g) = Yi (g,v ) < Yi (g”,v ) = v(g”), a 
contradiction again. Thus, if Y satisfies the dummy axiom, then Y∈Ψ. 
Now assume Y is proportional. If Yi ( g,v ) = 0 for all i and g, then clearly Y is 
value-monotonic. For the other case, assume on the contrary that ∃g such that  
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v(g) ≥ v(g’)  for all g’⊂ gS for some S ⊃ N(g), and also ∃g”⊂ gS  with  Yi (g”,v) ≥ Yi (g,v)  
for all i∈ S with the inequality being strict for at least one j ∈S. Then as  
) vg, ( Yj
) v,g" ( Yj = 
) g ( v
) g" ( v  from proportionality, we infer v(g”) > v(g), which is a 
contradiction. Note that in case both v(g) and v(g”) are zero, we are in the first case 
where Yi ( g,v ) = 0 for all g, as otherwise the proportionality condition would be 
violated. If one of them is zero, we consider it in the upper side of the fraction. Thus, if Y 
is proportional, then we have Y∈Ψ. 
 
 
 
Lemma 2 : For any v∈V,     NC ( v )  =  ∩  NC ( v, Y ) = NC( v,YE ).   
                     Y∈Ψ                                  
     
Proof :  We will show that   NC ( v )  ⊂  ∩ NC ( v, Y ) ⊂  NC( v,YE )  ⊂  NC ( v ).  
         Y∈Ψ                                   
First inclusion: Take any g ∈ NC ( v ). Assume ∃ Y∈ Ψ such that  g ∉ NC ( v, Y ). Then 
∃  S ⊂ N, g’⊂ gS  with ∀i∈S   Yi (g’,v)) ≥ Yi (gS ,v) , where the inequality holds stricly 
for at least one j∈ S. But we know that  v(gS) ≥ v(g’) as  g ∈ NC ( v ) and g’⊂ gS. Thus 
Y is not value-monotonic, a contradiction. 
Second inclusion:  We already know that YE∈Ψ. 
Third inclusion:  Take any g ∈NC ( v, YE) . Assume on the contrary that  ∃ S ⊂ N, g’⊂ 
gS  with v(g’) > v(gS), that is g∉ NC ( v ) . Now YiE (g’,v) = N
gv )'(  > 

N
sv )g( = YiE (gS,v) 
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for all i∈N,  thus for all i∈S. Now, if we take S and g’, the condition that  g ∈NC ( v, YE) 
is violated, a contradiction. thus NC( v,YE )  ⊂  NC ( v ).   
                                
Lemma 3: For any v∈V+ ,    NC ( v ) ≠  Ø  ⇔  wV*(S) = v(gS). 
Proof :  ( ⇒) Take any g ∈ NC ( v ). Asume ij∉g. Now setting S = {i,j},  
v({ij}) > 0 = v(Ø) = v(gS), a contradiction. Thus g = gn.  Now ∀ S, ∀g’∈ gS : v(gS) = 
v(gS) ≥ v(g’);  thus wV (S) = v(gS) for all S⊂ N.  For the other direction, it suffices to 
note that the complete graph is in the network core. 
  
Lemma 4 : If v∈V  v is convex, then  wV is convex 
Proof :  Take any S, T ⊂ N. Assume on the contrary that wV (S∪T) + wV (S∩T) < wV(S)+ 
wV (T).  Now ∃ g’, g” with g’ ⊂ gS  and  g” ⊂ gT  such that  wV (S) = v(g’),  wV (T) = 
v(g”). Note that we have wV ( S∪T ) ≥ v ( g’ ∪g” ) and   wV (S∩T) ≥ v(g’∩ g”)  as 
g’∪g”  ⊂ gS∪T ,  g’∩ g” ⊂ gS∩T , thus implying that 
 v (g’) + v (g”)  =  wV (S)+ wV (T)  >   wV (S∪T) + wV (S∩T)  ≥   
v (g’∪g” ) + v (g’∩g” ),  a contradiction as v is convex. 
Note that the converse need not be true. Consider N = {1, 2, 3} and  
wV ( S ) = S– 1 for all Ø ≠ S ⊂ N, which is clearly convex. Consider any v that 
induces this TU game. Let  g0 = Ø,  g1 = {12},  g2 ={12, 13}. Now  wV ( 12 ) = 1 = v(g1). 
Let v (g2) = a. Now wV (1, 2, 3 ) = 2 = v(gN) because if some network with two links 
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would have the maximal value, this would violate the convexity of v. To see this note 
that adding the last link to a two-link graph would not result in a strictly positive 
marginal increase in value while it would lead to a strictly positive marginal increase in 
value when it is added to the empty graph. Now from convexity of v,  2 – a ≥  a–1 ≥1– 0 
should be satisfied. It is a contradiction, thus there does not exist a convex value 
function inducing v. 
             Now we will look more closely to the implications of convexity of a value 
function on the TU game it induces. 
 
Lemma 5 :  Let v ∈ V+ . If v is anonymous and convex, then wV  is symmetric and     
S
SwS
#
−#− # )1()( w      is increasing in #S  for #S ≥ 1.  
 
Proof : First of all, note that the convexity of v ∈ V+ implies the monotonicity of v, 
because we have  v( ij ) > 0 as  v ∈ V+  and the convexity of v  implies that 
 v(g ∪ ij)) - v( g )  ≥  v( ij ) - v( Ø )  > 0   for all g∈G and  all i ,  j ∈ N with ij ∉g. Thus  
we will use  wV (S) = v(gS) hereafter in the proof. 
Claim1:  ∀ S,  T ⊂ N  with  T  ⊂  S   and ∀ i,j,k,l ∈N with i∈S, j∉S, k∈T, l ∉ S, 
we have  v(gS∪ij)  −  v(gS) ≥  v(gT∪kl) −  v(gT).   
Proof of claim 1: Firstly note that  for any permutation π on N, and for any g∈G 
π( g ∪ g’)  = {π( i)π( j)  ij ∈ g ∪ g’ } = {π( i)π( j)  ij ∈ g or  ij ∈ g’ }= 
{π( i)π( j)  ij ∈ g } ∪ {π( i)π( j)  ij ∈ g’ } = π( g) ∪ π( g’ ).    
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Now consider the permutation  π such that π( i) = k ,π( k ) = i and π( m ) =  m for 
all m∈ N \{ i,k }. Hereafter let us denote this type of  permutations, i.e., transpositions, 
by   π : i↔ k. Now 
v(gS∪ij)  −  v(gS) = v(π (gS∪ij))  −  v(π (gS)) = v(π (gS )  ∪ π(ij) )   −  v(π (gS))  
=v(gS∪kj)  −  v(gS)  as  k , i∈S. 
Now by considering the transposition µ : j↔ l, 
v(gS∪kj)  −  v(gS) = v(µ (gS∪kj))  −  v(µ (gS)) = v(µ (gS )  ∪ µ (kj) )   −  v(µ (gS))  
= v(gS∪kl)  −  v(gS) ≥  v(gT∪kl) −  v(gT)  as l , j∉ S   and v is convex. 
In what we did above, we used the fact that, a complete graph on S remains the 
same under a transposition, if the transposed vertices both belong or both do not belong 
to the coalition S. 
 
Claim 2: For all S ⊂ N,  for any  {i1 , i2,  i3, ...,im } ⊂ S,     {j1 , j2,  j3, ...,jm }⊂  S   and  
any k ≠l with k,l∉ S,  we have     
  v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,imk}) = v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jml }).   
Proof of claim 2:  Consider the permutation π  with π( iP) = jP  and π( jP) = iP  for all   
p∈{1,2, ....m} and π(k) = l, π( l ) = k , where π  acts as  the identity permutation on the 
rest of the society.  Notice that this is possible, as trivially this permutation is the 
composition of m+1 transpositions. 
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Now under this permutation, 
v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,imk}) = v(π (gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,imk})) = 
 v(π (gS) ∪ π{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,imk})) = v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jml }).   
The last equality is justified by the fact that the permutation only switches pairs 
which either belong to S or both not belong to S. It can also be justified as this particular 
permutation is a composition of transpositions; each satisfying the same equality, the 
composite function satisfies the equality.  
 
Claim 3: For all  S ⊂ N,  for any  {i1 , i2,  i3, ...,im, ...} ⊂ S,     {j1 , j2,  j3, ...,jm, ...}⊂  S   
and any  k,l∉ S, we have, for any m > 0  
v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,im+2k}) − v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,im+1k}) ≥ 
v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jm+1l }) − v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jml })   
and in particular in the boundary case,  
v(gS∪{i1k, i2k}) − v(gS∪{i1k})   ≥   v(gS∪{ j1l }) − v(gS).   
Proof of claim3:  For the m=0 boundary case (with an abuse of notation); we have       
v(gS∪{i1k, i2k}) − v(gS∪{i1k}) = v(gS∪{j1l, j2l}) − v(gS∪{i2l})  ≥ v(gS∪{ j1l }) − v(gS).    
Note that the first equality is a direct corollary of claim 2. Similarly for m ≥ 1; 
v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,iK+2k}) − v(gS∪{i1k, i2k, i3k ...,iK+1k})  
= v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jK+2l }) − v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jKl, jK+2l  })   
≥  v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jK+1l }) − v(gS∪{ j1l,  j2l,  j3l,  ...,jKl }),   
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where the first equality follows from claim 2 and the inequality follows from the 
convexity of v. 
Now turning to our lemma, obviously  wV is symmetric as v is anonymous. Also 
as  v  is convex, the following inequalities yield the desired result. 
Let  S = { i1, i2, i3, ...,iK }, and  iK+1 , iK+2 ∈ N \ S.  Note that 
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Now, the first and the last equalities follow from monotonicity of v. The middle 
equalities are written with an abuse of notation, for t = 0 would imply the nonexistence 
of the it ik+1  or  the    it ik+1  link in the summation. If the summation is carried out, “the 
last minus the first terms” will  remain, while the middle terms cancel out.  
The inequality in the middle follows from  claims, 1,2 and 3. Thus we are done.  
In this lemma, we have shown that, convexity of the value function implies a 
property of the induced TU game which is stronger than mere convexity. The converse 
is also true. 
Lemma 6 : Let w be a monotonic and symmetric TU game, where ∀S⊂ N \ {Ø},    
w(S) ≥ 0  and w(S) = 0 if  #S = 1  (the associated normalization for TU games induced 
from value functions).  
If  
S
SwS
#
−#− # )1()( w      is increasing in #S  for #S ≥ 1  then there exists a value 
function v ∈ V+ inducing w, where v is anonymous and convex. 
 Proof :   We will construct a suitable v : 
For g=Ø assign v (g)=0. For any g∈G \ {Ø},  there exists a unique k∈ Z+ with  
n ≥ k ≥ 2 such that  > #g  ≥   where #g stands for the number of links in g. 
Now set 




2
k



 −
2
1k
v (g)  =  w(k-1)  +  [w(k)-w(k-1)]   



 −−







2
1
2
  ]  
2
1-k
 - g[#
kk
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Now our value function is well defined. Clearly v ∈ V+ as v (Ø)=0 and for any 
g∈G with #g >0 we have v(g) ≥  w(k)  ≥ w(2) > 0.  As v is defined through the number 
of links g contains, v  is surely anonymous. We will show that it is convex.  
            Now let  f: {0,1,2,..., }  ℜ  be defined by  f (#g) = v (g)  Note that , by 
construction of v, f is a convex function in #g, which follows from the increasing 
coefficients of #g, which, in turn, is implied by the condition on w that  




2
n →



 −−



2
1
2
  1)]-w(k-[w(k)
kk
 is increasing in k. Thus convexity of  v  follows from the convexity of 
f.   
 
Note that in both lemma 5 and 6 anonymity (respectively symmetricity) is crucial 
in the sense that neither may hold if we delete anonymity.  
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CHAPTER V 
                                                     
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Following the setting in Jackson (1996), we defined the value function on the set 
of all possible graphs. What we tried to do is to inquire which properties of the value 
function are inherited by the TU game it induces. This is important as we know much 
more about TU games and their solutions, whereas we have less knowledge networks. 
What we find is that, under anonymity, convexity of the value function is equivalent to a 
stronger form of convexity of the induced TU game. Our last two lemmata establish a 
bridge to associate the well known “nonemptiness of the core” results in both the 
network and the TU game settings, when we restrict ourselves to appropriately convex 
structures in both contexts. So this is a towards associating our knowledge in 
cooperative game theory with the network setting of Jackson (1996). Moreover, we 
defined the network core with respect to a value function (and then also with respect to a 
value function and an allocation rule pair) in an attempt introduce the counter part of  the 
core for TU games in the network framework. What we found is that the network core 
with respect to a value function consists of graphs that are in the network core with 
respect to the same value function and  any allocation rule in a quite wide class (namely 
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the class of value monotonic allocation rules), which, in turn is the same as the core 
corresponding to the egalitarian allocation rule only.   
 From this point on, further study can be focused especially on relaxing 
the structure that we imposed on the evaluation of the benefits of being in a coalition. In 
this study, we assumed the rest of the society to be isolated when we evaluated the 
possible deviations from a particular cooperation structure on the part of a coalition. 
This is a very restrictive assumption, given the generality we permit concerning the class 
of value functions and allocation rules. The next step could be redefining the network 
core concept in α- or β-core sense, where the rest of the society also comes into play, 
actively. Similarly, in this study we defined the potential of a coalition merely as the 
maximal value of a network that coalition can form by itself. This also is vulnerable to 
the same logic we discussed above; the rest of the society is considered as isolated. 
Thus, the way we induce the TU game can be similarly redefined in various ways. 
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